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Original Post: https://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliaria/temas-calientes/155262-evento-de-tunguska-apunta-a-bomba-atomica-nazi.html

Stalin and the fabrication of the Tunguska myth

All existing photographs of Tunguska show an identical spectacle: the unprecedented devastation of a gigantic forest mass.

These photographs are from at least 1927, according to Soviet sources themselves, the year in which Leonid Kulik is said to have discovered the site after carrying out his prosaic and fortunate sleigh expedition, crossing thousands of kilometers of impenetrable forest. The aerial photographs are, according to sources, somewhat later, from the late 1930s. However, they offer the same spectacle: total desolation, no forest recovery despite more than thirty years having passed since the event.

Starting in 1946, the recovery of the Tunguska forest seems almost instantaneous, as occurred in the years following the bombing of Hiroshima, due to the effect of radiation. A miraculous delayed response of nature?

But we have a good nearby example: In 1980, the volcanic explosion of Mount St. Helen occurred, located in the state of Washington, in the extreme northwest of the United States. . A force a million times greater than that of the Tunguska phenomenon makes half a mountain disappear, and destroys and fells millions of trees within a radius of tens of kilometers. But the sequence of photographs taken subsequently reveal the almost total and spectacular recovery of the forests neighboring the volcano in just fifteen years.

However, almost forty years after the mysterious Tunguska explosion in 1946, the appearance of the devastated forest panorama is still identical to that of the St. Helen forests in 1981, just a year after the American catastrophe. Something similar happens in Hiroshima: but due to the radiation, accelerated plant growth occurs in the area previously destroyed by the atomic bomb. If the Soviet hypothesis of Kulik's story is true, in 1927 the recovery of the Tunguska forest should have been almost complete.

Everything seems to indicate that the Tunguska explosion could not have occurred in 190. It is a sophisticated falsification by Stalin's secret services, which hid the traces of the mysterious deflagration behind the smoke screen of the fall of several meteorites that occurred at the beginning of the century. in an undetermined area of Siberia and after a fantastic story of a supposed search expedition that began precisely at the beginning of Stalinism, and ended in 1942, when Leonid A. Kulik died at the age of sixty, fighting on the Eastern Front. against the Germans... and upon being arrested, exterminated by typhus and disintegrated in a German concentration camp!! . (It should be noted that the Russians never sent anyone to the front who knew anything more than reading and writing. All men and women with higher education were exempt from combat from the first day and were used in the Soviet industries in the rear. Much less sixty-year-old scientists were sent to the front).

 


How Tunguska turned out

Why attack Tunguska?

When Adolf Hitler was shown the operation of the new and revolutionary Me262 jet fighter in 1943, he reacted in an apparently illogical way: he decided to convert the new fighter into a tactical bomber, to the surprise and dismay of the military present. Hitler saw in that fighter the possibility of showing his enemies that he could still attack and bomb them with total impunity, just as the Allies did using the gigantic bomber raids that hit Germany.

The same thing happened with the V-2 missile. Even though it was a technical marvel, militarily the V-2 was an absolute failure. It caused more deaths among the troops in charge of its management and construction than as a result of its impact on enemy territory. Many, including Armaments Minister Albert Speer himself, knew that at that time the rocket program was an immensely superfluous expense for the Reich, but Hitler saw it differently.

The V-2 was for him a "diplomatic weapon", an instrument that could force the allies to a truce or to sign a peace provoked by fear. Hitler never sent the V-2 against the Soviets, since he simply did not consider that to be a measure of pressure against Stalin and his army, dispersed and almost indifferent to the destruction and human losses.

The Führer was obsessed with geopolitics. For him, any action could have indirect political consequences, so baroque and unpredictable that few around him were able to detect or guess. This same criterion pushed him to sign the non-aggression pact with Russia in 1939, to declare war on the Americans in 1941 in order to pressure the Japanese to attack the Russian rear, or to withdraw the best SS troops from the battle of Kursk at its peak and send them to Italy, in order to reinforce the morale of the Italians still loyal to Mussolini after his overthrow in 1943. That was Hitler.

For Hitler the atomic bomb was essentially another " diplomatic weapon" to radically change the course of events and discovering for the first time a way of doing politics that later everyone would call "nuclear deterrence policy". Bombing a remote and uninhabited region of Siberia offered several advantages, surely inexplicable to anyone not familiar with the psychology of the head of the Reich.

There was no way to seriously damage the Soviets with a single atomic bomb, since their industry and army were scattered throughout the Soviet immensity.

It would have been another thing if Hitler had had several hundred bombs like that of Hiroshima, which, well used on the eastern front, could have disintegrated a good part of the Russian army. The risk to the Germans was minimal, in case the bomb did not explode when dropped on Tunguska. The atomic device would be lost in the dense and deserted Siberian forest, with no possibility of being immediately recovered and reused by the Soviets.

By intentionally bombing a desert area of Siberia, Hitler avoided increasing the hatred and retaliation that the Russian troops, already in German territory, were showing against the conquered German population and army. With the explosion in Tunguska they warned Stalin and his allies of the existence of the atomic weapon.

Hitler's objective was essentially another: to persuade the Anglo-Americans that it was better to sign an agreement, or else he could bomb New York or Washington, air targets equidistant from distant Tunguska, if we take the center of Europe. Hitler hoped that the Russians would immediately tell the Americans about the Tunguska explosion, and that they would then draw conclusions by measuring the distances, and discover that they might be susceptible to a Nazi atomic attack.

In Hitler's mind, Tunguska was therefore the ideal site to drop the first operational atomic bomb in history, a bomb identical to the one on Hiroshima.

But once again, his sophisticated geopolitical expectations would clash with the elemental pragmatism of his Anglo-American and Russian enemies, who rarely relented or understood Hitler's complex political machinations. The Head of the Reich of the thousand years would still have the strength to organize his last "great geopolitical move", perhaps the most successful, in view of the strong controversies, the repression and censorship that the "Nazi" still arouses, and the millions of admirers of national socialism in the world almost sixty years later: the creation of the historical myth of the resistance of the Nazi regime in Berlin until total annihilation.

Hitler promises final victory.

In his last radio address on February 23, 1945, Adolf Hitler himself promises final victory, while declaring, in the mouth of a dramatic Joseph Goebbels, that he asks God May I forgive him for using a devastating and definitive weapon. That same morning he learned of the successful mission of the Heinkel He 177 that he had taken off twelve hours earlier from an airport in Czechoslovakia. Optimistic about the atomic test, he even dares to personally visit his troops, who are fighting on the Oder front.

The ambitious plan aims to show the allies the power of the new weapon, as well as the possible bombing radius of Nazi aviation, in order to force a truce on both fronts of the conflict.

Hitler thought that the practical equidistance from Tunguska to Thuringia and from New York to Kristiansand (the point of Europe under German control closest to the American east coast) would force the Americans to think about the possibility of a German attack against some overpopulated city. from the American east coast.

Simultaneously, the neutral Spanish government is informed of the collateral and unintentional danger that some Spanish border cities with France may suffer as a result of the use of the new weapons. At that time the French ports of Bordeaux, Nice, Toulon and Marseille, all close to Spain, were being used massively by the Anglo-American fleet, and therefore became priority targets for a possible German atomic bombing.

But Stalin remains silent, and does not communicate the nuclear attack suffered in Tunguska to his Anglo-American allies. His troops are already very close to Berlin, and he knows that even a generalized German attack on Russia will have little effect on the Soviet war machine: his main cities are already destroyed, he has lost twenty million Russians to German hands, and his industry is dispersed. through the immensities of Siberia. There is no possibility of a concentrated attack against the Russians for these types of weapons, unless Nazi Germany has hundreds of bombs like the Tunguska bomb.

A few days later, Stalin verified that there was no massive German atomic attack, and ordered the Red Army to make a definitive assault on the capital of the Reich. Hitler doesn't use the bomb.

After the failure of possible negotiations with Stalin, and in the absence of an Anglo-American response, Hitler finds himself in the worst possible situation. His army is retreating in the west, retreating bloodily in the east and its industrial system, which remains 80% intact in the German underground, is suffocating due to lack of supplies.

A warning bombing like that of Tunguska against the Americans was extremely difficult for the Nazis: All of Europe occupied by the allies, as well as the entire American east coast, the only area within reach of a German bombing, was densely populated and the bombing as a direct attack against the population. An impact in the Atlantic could cause unpredictable effects, perhaps a tsunami, as the bomb has not been tested at sea. Additionally, it could be misinterpreted as a German technical error or due to a natural phenomenon, such as the fall of a meteorite. A demonstration in the North African desert or Greenland could give a wrong image of the destructive power of the bomb, as occurred in the Alamogordo Trinity test: the explosion only destroyed the tower that held the bomb and vitrified a thin soil layer, giving rise to a new mineral, trinitine.

Hitler only had the possibility of a direct attack against New York or another large city on the American east coast, to force a possible peace with the West, even though the V-2s that were already launched on London were unable to force the English. to a negotiation.

Hitler is unsure: the sudden death of perhaps millions of people as a result of a nuclear attack could provoke an unwanted American response. Faced with the overwhelming Allied air superiority, Hitler fears that the Allies will finally dare to carry out a massive bombardment with gases or bacteriological weapons, much more lethal than the conventional bombings that the Germans were already suffering in all their intensity.

Furthermore, the well-founded fear persists that the Americans already have an atomic weapon with similar characteristics, which has not yet been used, for the same reasons that chemical or bacteriological agents were not used.

The Americans would not have so many considerations when it came to the atomic bombing of Japanese cities. They knew, thanks to the capture of the submarine U-234, that the Japanese had neither atomic bombs, nor rockets, nor the capacity for a possible retaliatory response against the United States, so they could carry out the nuclear attack with total impunity.

However, this fear of guaranteed retaliation did work during the fifty years of cold war that followed, in which the use of atomic weapons was avoided thanks to the mutual strategy of "nuclear deterrence."

If Germany had managed to finish production of the A-9/A-10 intercontinental missiles or the Horten XVIII or Junkers E-555 long-range jet bombers, or the Sänger antipodal bomber, Hitler would have been able to attack the Allies with some guarantee. from their underground bases in Thuringia, while he remained entrenched in his Alpine stronghold, until the desired truce was forced.

The German dictator would also have needed mass production of atomic bombs to be at least ten times greater than what had been achieved until then, just two operational bombs of plutonium and one of uranium, and fissile material for another twenty bombs...

On March 20, Budapest fell definitively, and with Hungary the gigantic Manfred-Weiss factories also fell, belonging to the economic emporium of the SS and the place where German atomic bombs were assembled. The importance of this factory was such that the five best divisions of the SS, more than 70,000 men, were moved from southern Germany and Austria, causing a rapid enemy advance on both fronts. Although only 1,000 Waffen men survived the terrible fight in defense of Manfred-Weiss, Hitler, in a fit of rage, orders the SS soldiers to tear off the insignia bands with the name on their arms. of the Führer, and disavows Heinrich Himmler of his power. From then on, General Kammler will also be the "de facto" head of the Waffen SS.

On April 3, the Americans and Russians invade Thuringia, occupying secret German bases and factories. Hitler urgently meets with Kammler and sends him new orders: There was still a possibility of an air attack against an American city from the base of Kristiansand, in Norway, sending a long-range He177 bomber to pick up a nuclear device brought there by the submarine U-234.

Following Roosevelt's death, Hitler will once again believe in a radical change in the situation, waiting like Frederick the Great for the miracle of a possible imminent confrontation between the Western allies and their increasingly unreliable Soviet comrades-in-arms. The confrontation desired by Hitler would only come after the Führer's melodramatic death, and would last for the next 50 years, the years of the "cold war."

On April 15, after verifying that the new American president Truman would continue hostilities, and fearing a brutal Anglo-American retaliation, Hitler decided not to carry out the air attack against New York from Kristiansand. That same day the submarine U-234 leaves the Norwegian port heading to Japan, but its final destination is uncertain, given the development of events. Hitler's decision not to use the atomic bomb provokes a general rout among the high command of the SS and the Luftwaffe, both in favor of the use of nuclear weapons as the only alternative to force a desperate pact with the allies. Herman Goering will announce his desire to negotiate with the Americans on April 23, which will lead to his arrest by order of Hitler. At the same time Heinrich Himmler will contact Count Bernadotte to negotiate a separate surrender, without counting on the Führer.

Hitler focuses his last resources on a "heroic" end for his regime, with the idea of marking universal history with an unprecedented epic resistance, sacrificing every last man in the capital of the Reich.

A few days after Hitler's suicide, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, newly appointed foreign minister of Admiral Doenitz's ephemeral government, told the Reuters news agency that "Hitler had not used the last terrible weapon that Hitler Reich had at his disposal..." On May 10, Admiral Doenitz signs the unconditional surrender of Germany. The war in Europe was over.

Hitler, now dead, still had one last trump card to play against his enemies in the distant war in the Pacific. Always concerned about his complex machinations of political aesthetics, the Führer preferred to go down in History without becoming the Father of the first atomic attack, leaving responsibility for that final crime in the hands of the Japanese. Little did Hitler imagine that on August 6, 1945, the Americans, in the name of democracy and freedom, would finally get their hands dirty with WuWa, the Nazi bomb, causing the instant murder of 150,000 people in one second. A speed record not yet equaled in the elimination of human beings.